Spracherlogik: und die Kraft der Erkenntnistheorie

Edited by Daniel Soto

(1). Language helps us think.

1.1- We can think without language, and we cannot both think and not think generally about things

1.1.a- Thus, we are condemned to think always—except in death

1.1.b- A priori concepts allow us to think without the help of language, following axioms. 90°=90°, for all right angles must equate to one another in terms of measurement following the Euclidean postulates.

(1.1.b.2- This knowledge of postulates essentially precedes us and empirical explanations)

This numerical equivalency does not require the knowledge of “what” a number is or “why” it is what it is. It “just is” because such postulates cannot be divided into smaller explanations of what they are, and cannot be derived from another fact except itself; in fact, it is the reverse, as postulates are the foundations for theorems. For example, 2 balloons, when presented to a person, regardless of whether they know what a balloon is or what the essence of ballooness is, are recognized in the same numerical quality as a group of 2 other balloons, despite physical differences (unless they alter the quantity of balloons). So,

A={1, 1} and B={1, 1}; for further description,

A={1, 1}^{ red, green} and B={1, 1}^{ blue, yellow}; thus |A|=|B| and |p(A)|=|p(B)|, but without necessarily being A=B or B=A.

We know the sets have the same cardinality without having to explain why, except “they have the same number of elements” but that does not require thought, because we axiomatically know that:

2=2

The 90°=90° notion is true because it is not false or conditional, hence it cannot be partially true, but true under any and all circumstances except cases where 90≠90.

1.1.c- The principle of non-contradiction states that something cannot both be and not be ( “A is B” and “A is not B” both cannot coexist as facts, because one must be false). Therefore,

|A|=|B| and |A|≠|B| cannot both coexist as facts,

for one must be false, and one must be true, the latter in this case being |A|=|B| because 2=2. 90=90 cannot be false because 90°≠90° is already false. We have just proved a postulate to be true, but this was entirely useless because postulates are always true under any circumstance.

1.1.d- Two contradictory statements cannot be false. “Socrates is a man” cannot be false if “Socrates is not a man” is false.

1.1.e- a priori concepts do not need language to be proven or to be communicated.

(2). We can think without language, but not in a way that lets us understand the “why”, “how”, and our own thought.

2.1 Mathematical axioms are explained by “just being” true and applicable; but this is no explanation, just innate recognition

2.2 We cannot understand other concepts in manner of 2.1. For example, we perceive totalitarian regimes to be wrong, but it is not entirely axiomatic, and we must, with ideas developed by language, explain “why” exactly they are wrong, not “just is.”

2.3 Besides an axiom, we cannot communicate what we do not understand.

2.3.a-If a totalitarian regime is wrong but we cannot communicate why, there is a chance that perhaps it is not actually wrong, or perhaps we don’t understand the concept of a totalitarian regime beyond it merely existing.

2.4 We are rational and ideological beings; we must understand ourselves through the languages of skepticism and ideas that are not axiomatic

2.4.a- As such, I know that I am a mammal because I was birthed, not in the form of an egg, and I have mammary glands. Mammals are mortal animals, therefore I am a mortal animal if I am a mammal. I also possess all the characteristics of the human species, who are mammals, so by extension I am also human. I am a mortal mammalian human animal of the homo sapiens species. I know myself categorically, but not myself subjective as I am a person, and the ideas I produce originally, or as byproducts of my beliefs.

2.4.b- I cannot explain who I am subjectively by categorization and without my subjective language.

(3). We can subjectively understand through knowledge

3.1 The more we know about a thing, the more we understand it.

3.2 We learn about a thing through language by understanding it through knowing more about it by said language.

3.2. a- Language can let us consume the basic facts of a thing to create logical subjective meanings and values of it and by it.

3.2. b- If our language towards a certain thing is restricted, our knowledge is restricted also because the method for learning it is restricted.

3.2. c- Therefore, according to 3.2.b, our language controls how much we know, what we know, and how we think about a thing subjectively beyond axioms.

(3.2.c.1- By association, we can only express something through how much we know about it, so this limits our expression about said thing as well)

(4). Following the path we’ve established, then, [it can be said that] controlling the language of a person, or group, controls the way they think beyond a postulate.

(5) Therefore, people are bound to how and why they use their language, and they are limited to what extent they can use it.

Spracherlogik Appendix A

Linguistically there appears to be a dynamic when the interaction of peoples occurs. Besides a physical means of assertion, language creates the power imbalance that subjugates an individual to the power of the other. This phenomenon is also seen in larger groups and entire estates, such as in a totalitarian regime, to follow the example offered much above. Language, as we have established with the main text of Spracherlogik, is very much epistemological in essence, allowing the acquisition and thereby understanding of knowledge and conceptual information, but also allowing the provision of that knowledge. As such, we shall build the following points based on Miranda Fricker’s points from Epistemic Injustice.

(6). A person can be denied the conception of their existence through the linguistic hindrances beyond the naturally occurring ones

6.1- Wittgenstein already established the limitations of language, so I do not feel the responsibility to regurgitate the entirety of his points. We are shackled, essentially, to this system of communications that possesses inherent faults and limitations.

6.1.a- Certain messages or pictures, the sensuous phenomena that subjectively occupy us, cannot be represented with atomic sentences, although they can be established as such.

6.1.b- “You are in front of me”, very well, in the case that you appear to stand directly in front of me then this proposition is true. “I have been shot” would be true in a case where I have been shot. “It is painful”; through surveying we are cognizant that being shot is painful. A person tells us it is painful, and as a member of the same species we think we can conceive a similar experience, although we can also recognize it is ineffable to us the idea of being shot, as it is undesirable and absurd enough that the mind wishes to neglect a possibility of fully conceiving such process. In death we find this also. Furthermore when the person tells us it is a painful process, we might inquire into the type of pain and the experience of that particular pain in that particular, subjective instance; and here is where the limit of the language is established.

6.1.c- Once we endeavor to describe that subjective experience, language fails. It fails because the matter is not of truth and falsity anymore. It is not merely factual as it is, it is a partial truth. Even when describing it in a relative manner, for a person to say being shot is significantly more dolorous than having a loved one perish, that truth becomes partial to the individual, as it can be thereupon disagreed by the truth of another individual, so it is not an universal truth. We often call these opinions, but they are much more complex.

6.1.c.1- Opinions are subject to multiple variations